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Abstract. Errett Bishop’s work in constructive mathematics is
overwhelmingly regarded as a turning point for mathematics based
on intuitionistic logic. It brought new life to this form of math-
ematics and prompted the development of new areas of research
which witness today’s depth and breadth of constructive mathe-
matics. Surprisingly, notwithstanding the extensive mathematical
progress since the publication in 1967 of Errett Bishop’s Founda-
tions of Constructive Analysis [9], there has been no correspond-
ing advances in the philosophy of constructive mathematics Bishop
style.
The aim of this paper is to foster the philosophical debate about
this form of mathematics. I begin by considering key elements of
philosophical remarks by Bishop, especially focusing on Bishop’s
assessment of Brouwer. I then compare these remarks with “tra-
ditional” philosophical arguments for intuitionistic logic and argue
that the latter are in tension with Bishop’s views. “Traditional”
arguments for intuitionistic logic turn out to be also in conflict with
significant recent developments in constructive mathematics. This
rises pressing questions for the philosopher of mathematics, espe-
cially with regard to the possibility of offering alternative philo-
sophical arguments for constructive mathematics. I conclude with
the suggestion to look anew at Bishop’s own remarks for inspira-
tion.
1. Introduction
The last fifty years have seen the flourishing of constructive ap-
proaches to mathematics and the growth of a variety of research groups
working on constructive mathematics. This has given rise to a rich lit-
erature witnessing the depth and breadth of constructive mathematics,
of which this volume is further proof. A principal drive for these de-
velopments has been the stimulus derived from the natural alliance
This is a preprint of an article to appear in Handbook of Bishop’s Mathematics,
D. Bridges, H. Ishihara, M. Rathjen and H. Schwichtenberg (eds.), Cambridge
University Press, forthcoming.
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between constructive mathematics and computer aided computation,
at first only an envisaged possibility and, more recently, a fact. The
spark that started the present abundance of constructive mathematics
was the publication in 1967 of Errett Bishop’s Foundations of Con-
structive Analysis [9]. Bishop’s book also prompted pivotal work in
logic, with the emergence of new foundational frameworks, such as in-
tuitionistic set and type theories, which, in turn, fostered fundamental
work in computer assisted theorem proving.1
Notwithstanding the extensive progress in constructive mathematics
since 1967, there has been no corresponding advance in its philosophy.
With very few exceptions, Bishop’s mathematics has at most received a
quick mention, but no thorough consideration.2 My overarching aim in
this chapter is to enliven the philosophical debate about constructive
mathematics Bishop-style.3 There are a number of reasons to stim-
ulate the philosophical reflection on constructive mathematics. First
of all, the significant advances of this form of mathematics in recent
times and its natural bond with computation make constructive math-
ematics much more prominent within today’s mathematical landscape
than at its birth. An analysis of constructive mathematics is therefore
important and pressing for a philosopher of mathematics who aims to
genuinely engage with contemporary mathematics.4 Second, Bishop’s
mathematics, as further argued below, requires altogether different
philosophical considerations compared with better known approaches
to intuitionistic mathematics, such as Brouwer’s. Third, a sympathetic
analysis of Bishop’s philosophical remarks presents us with intriguing
1See e.g. [15, 14, 60, 22]. See also [43, 62, 63, 40, 59, 44, 1, 3, 75] and [25, 27, 65, 2].
Note that Constable [64, p. 83] credits directly Bishop’s influence for the work that
lead to the design of “a large computing system that would execute constructive
proofs”.
2For example, Stewart Shapiro mentions Bishop very briefly in the well-known
textbook [70] (e.g. at pages 184, in a footnote, 187 and 189) and in [71, 72].
The only exceptions I am aware of are [45, 7] and an exchange on the possibility of
developing constructively the mathematical foundations of quantum physics [47, 48,
16, 8, 6, 49, 69, 68]. The lack of progress on the philosophy of Bishop’s mathematics
is quite surprising, since there has been instead sustained analysis of other variants
of constructivism inspired especially by the work of Brouwer, Gentzen, Dummett,
Prawitz and Martin-Löf.
3In the following, I write “constructive mathematics” to denote the form of
mathematics initiated by Bishop, and “intuitionistic mathematics” to refer to other
forms of mathematics that use intuitionistic logic.
4A similar point is made in [33], in agreement with the spirit of the “philosophy
of the mathematical practice” (see e.g. [58, 42, 24]).
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foundational ideas that deserve to be better understood and further
developed.
The article is organised as follows. I begin by examining key elements
of Bishop’s philosophical remarks, especially focusing on Bishop’s as-
sessment of Brouwer, as it illuminates some of the most important
aspects of Bishop’s own foundational reflection. I then briefly sketch
the most salient features of what I would like to call “traditional” argu-
ments for intuitionistic mathematics and consider the question whether
these arguments could also support today’s constructive mathematics.
I argue that this is not the case, as traditional arguments are in ten-
sion with both Bishop’s remarks and the constructive mathematical
practice. This observation raises fundamental questions for the phi-
losophy of constructive mathematics, and indicates that a thoroughly
new approach is required. I conclude with the suggestion to look anew
at Bishop’s own remarks for inspiration.
2. Bishop on Brouwer
In this section, I review some prominent themes from Bishop’s re-
flection on mathematics, especially focusing on the relation between
Bishop and his main predecessor, Brouwer.5 My aim is to understand
Bishop’s thought rather than defend his views. Bishop often combined
severe criticism of Brouwer with recognition of his achievements. This
complex relationship with the founder of intuitionism is aptly portrayed
by Gabriel Stolzenberg in his review of [9], where Bishop’s “constructive
framework” is presented as “intimately related to Brouwer’s intuition-
ism – though with important differences” [73].
An important and often emphasized difference between Bishop’s and
Brouwer’s mathematics concerns the greater extent of the new form of
mathematics. According to Bishop [9, p. ix], Brouwer and other con-
structivists were more successful in their criticism of classical mathe-
matics than in replacing it with a better alternative. Soon after the
publication of the fundamental [9], Bishop’s work was celebrated for
“going substantially further mathematically” [41, p. 170]. For this rea-
son, mathematicians sympathetic to Bishop’s project took it to refute
the most prominent mathematical objection to Brouwerian intuition-
ism, famously emphasized by Hilbert and other critics of intuitionism,
for which relinquishing the principle of excluded middle is tantamount
5I especially draw from [9, 10, 11, 12].
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to relinquishing the science of mathematics altogether.6 Bishop him-
self writes that “Hilbert’s implied belief that there are a significant
number of interesting theorems whose statements (standing alone) are
constructive but whose proofs are not constructive (or cannot easily be
made constructive) has not been justified. In fact we do not know of
even one such theorem” [9, p. 354].
The greater extent of Bishop’s mathematics is only one of the
points of difference with Brouwer. Others relate to specific aspects of
Brouwer’s own approach, such as his treatment of the continuum and
his philosophical ideas. It is plausible that when Bishop distanced him-
self from Brouwer and his followers, he aimed at separating aspects of
the Brouwerian revolution he agreed with from others he found prob-
lematic. In so doing, he probably also hoped to attract to his new
mathematics classical mathematicians who did care about constructiv-
ity but were sceptical of Brouwer’s own approach. In the preface to
his book, Bishop [9, p. ix] mentions previous attempts to construc-
tivise mathematics, “the most sustained” of which was made by L. E.
J. Brouwer. He then notes that
[t]he movement Brouwer founded has long been dead,
killed partly by compromises of Brouwer’s disciples with
the viewpoint of idealism, partly by extraneous peculiar-
ities of Brouwer’s system which made it vague and even
ridiculous to practising mathematicians, but chiefly by
the failure of Brouwer and his followers to convince the
mathematical public that abandonment of the idealistic
viewpoint would not sterilize or cripple the development
of mathematics.” (Bishop 1967, p. ix)
In this passage, Bishop criticises Brouwer not only for “extraneous
peculiarities” of his mathematics, but also for his perceived inability
to communicate with and involve classical mathematicians.7 In the
following sections, I consider each point in turn.
6See [52, p 476]. As noted by Myhill in [61], also constructivists such as Heyting
thought that the “mutilation” of mathematics was an inevitable consequence of
their standpoint [51, p. 74]. See e.g. [61, 73] for examples of favourable reception
of Bishop’s book. See Beeson’s introduction to [13] for a more general discussion
of the overall reception of Bishop’s book.
7Note that in the quote above, Bishop claims that intuitionistic mathematics has
long been dead. A similar image makes its way in Douglas Bridges’s foreword to
[34], where he writes that Bishop “single-handedly showed that deep mathematics
could be developed constructively, and thereby pulled the subject back from the
edge of the grave.”
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3. Brouwer’s mathematics
In the “Constructivist Manifesto” that opens [9], Bishop criticises
Brouwer’s mathematics especially for its use of free choice sequences
in analysis. According to Bishop, free choice sequences make the con-
tinuum “not well enough defined” and the resulting mathematics “so
bizarre it becomes unpalatable to mathematicians” [9, p. 6]. As further
mentioned in section 4, a significant characteristic of Bishop’s mathe-
matics is its full compatibility with classical mathematics: every proof
in Bishop’s mathematics of a statement is also a classical proof of it.8 In
fact, one of the characteristics of Bishop’s approach emphasized from
the start is that it is not only compatible with classical mathematics,
but its “spirit” and “execution” is “much more like everyday modern
mathematics than anything previously done in a systematic construc-
tive way.” [41, p. 171] According to Bishop, Brouwer’s treatment of
the continuum, with the introduction of free choice sequences, marks
instead a more drastic departure from the standard classical approach,
and this, alone, makes Brouwer’s mathematics less appealing, or even
“unpalatable” to mathematicians.9
Bishop seems also to think that Brouwer’s free choice sequences
represent an undesirable interference of “metaphysical speculation” in
mathematics, as they are dictated by Brouwer’s philosophical view of
the continuum rather than by the needs of the mathematical practice.
Bishop further claims that Brouwer’s mathematics (in general) shows
“a preoccupation with the philosophical aspects of constructivism at
the expense of concrete mathematical activity.”10 [9, p. 6] On the
contrary, Bishop’s book aimed to develop a large portion of abstract
analysis within a constructive framework “with an absolute minimum
8See [21], especially Chapter 6.
9Feferman [41, p. 171] goes on writing: “Indeed, a (philosophically unprepared)
mathematician could pick up Bishop 1967 and read it as a straight piece of classical
Cantorian mathematics. What would be puzzling to him is the more involved choice
of certain notions and proofs, unless he also saw in what sense these were dictated
by constructive requirements.” A similar point is made in Myhill’s review [61, p.
744].
10Bishop [9, p. 6] writes: “Brouwer became involved in metaphysical specula-
tion by his desire to improve the theory of the continuum. A bugaboo of both
Brouwer and the logicians has been compulsive speculation about the nature of the
continuum. In the case of the logicians this leads to contortions in which various
formal systems, all detached from reality, are interpreted within one another in the
hope that the nature of the continuum will somehow emerge. In Brouwer’s case
there seems to have been a nagging suspicion that unless he personally intervened
to prevent it the continuum would turn out to be discrete.”
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of philosophical prejudice concerning the nature of constructive math-
ematics.” [9, p. ix]11
In subsequent texts, Bishop is more specific on what makes Brouwer’s
theory of the continuum problematic from his own point of view. For
example, Bishop [10, p. 53] deplores the lack of numerical interpreta-
tion of free choice sequences: “Brouwer’s intuitionism at first glance
contains elements that are extremely dubious; free choice sequences
and allied concepts admit no ready numerical interpretation.” Simi-
larly, in notes posthumously published as [12], Bishop writes that there
seem to be at least two motivations for Brouwer’s introduction of free
choice sequences. First, “it appears that Brouwer was troubled by a
certain aura of the discrete clinging to the constructive real number
system R”12 Second,
Brouwer had hopes of proving that every function from
R → R is continuous, using arguments involving free
choice sequences. [...] My objection to this is, that
by introducing such a theorem as “all f : R → R are
continuous” in the guise of axioms, we have lost con-
tact with numerical meaning. Paradoxically this terrible
price buys little or nothing of real mathematical value.
The entire theory of free choice sequences seems to me to
be made of very tenuous mathematical substance. [12,
p. 26]
Summarising, Bishop seems to think that Brouwer’s introduction of free
choice sequences marks too drastic a departure from ordinary math-
ematics and is not sufficiently well motivated mathematically as it is
not needed in practice. More importantly, free choice sequences can-
not be directly explained in terms of finitely performable computations
with the integers, therefore lacking clear numerical meaning. This is
seen as a very substantial defect by Bishop, for whom the possibility of
endowing mathematics with numerical meaning is a principal motive
for developing his constructive mathematics.
One may wonder whether notwithstanding Bishop’s disparaging re-
marks on free choice sequences, it would be beneficial for mathematics
as a whole not to neglect forms of mathematics such as Brouwer’s
that countenance more abstract notions of construction.13 As noted
11I further discuss this point in section 6.
12See also the quote from [9, p. 6], in footnote 10 above.
13I would like to thank a referee for asking this question and for drawing my
attention to the relevant passage of [56]. A related point is made by Veldman in
[77, p. 61]: “The principles proposed by Brouwer, even if one does not want to
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by Kreisel [56, p. 146-7], since Bishop focuses on lawlike sequences,
he does not offer a general explanation of why Brouwer’s principles of
continuity “does not really affect mathematical practice”.14 As further
mentioned in the next section, today’s constructive mathematicians
pledge to take a more encompassing approach compared with Bishop,
as they hope to analyse from their general point of view a number of
mathematical approaches, among which the classical one, the Brouwe-
rian one and the recursion-theoretic approach of the Russian school of
constructivism.15
Kreisel [56] further argues for the fruitfulness and the naturalness
from a mathematical perspective of focusing on abstract (rather than
more explicit) notions, and in particular on the most general notion
of construction.16 The interplay between more abstract and more ex-
plicit notions and their respective roles within different approaches to
mathematics is a very significant point that ought to be central to the
philosophy of mathematics, and especially to the philosophy of con-
structivism. Discussion of this point clearly exceeds the aims of this
note. I wish, however, to point out the fact that Kreisel’s comments
clearly indicate that one of the most significant differences between
a Brouwerian approach and Bishop’s own, is the crucial foundational
subscribe to the way he defends them, deserve to be discussed as possible starting
points for our common mathematical discourse.”
14It should be noted that Bishop [10, p. 67-8] does consider the question of how
one could accommodate Brouwer’s theory of free choice sequences within a formal
system. This, however, does not satisfy Kreisel who writes [56, p. 146-7]: “It is one
thing to point out (correctly), as Bishop does, that Brouwer’s assertion concerning
the continuity of (extensional) functions does not really affect mathematical practice
[...], if we simply take our functions as given together with a modulus of continuity.
But it is a separate matter to explain this step by showing that any definition
satisfying some abstract condition is bound to provide the additional information;
in other words by analysing (when possible) the most general notion of construction,
not merely definitions in some formal system such as Gödel’s T.”
15See [21] for a discussion of the most well-known varieties of constructive mathe-
matics. Note that very recent work suggests that, contrary to what Bishop thought,
there is the potential for practical results ensuing a Brouwerian approach to math-
ematics (see e.g. [5]).
16Note that the word “abstract” is here used in its mathematical rather than
philosophical sense. Kreisel [56, p 122] claims that Bishop’s 1967 book in some
respects witnesses this attitude, too, as Bishop does not pin down his notion of
algorithm to a specific notion like, for example, that of recursive function, work-
ing instead with a primitive notion of constructive function. The significance of
Bishop’s very abstract approach to the notion of computation is also emphasised,
for example, in [17].
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role the domain of the natural numbers has for Bishop. The role of the
natural numbers for Bishop is the main focus of Section 6.
4. Persuasion and dialogue
We saw Bishop’s criticism of Brouwer’s mathematics, but also of his
inability to convince the mathematical public of the viability of his in-
tuitionistic project. Bishop [9, p. 6] writes that Brouwer’s programme
“failed to gain support” as Brouwer was
an indifferent expositor and an inflexible advocate, con-
tending against the great prestige of Hilbert and the un-
deniable fact that idealistic mathematics produced the
most general results with the least effort.
Bishop was hopeful that constructive mathematics would eventually
prevail over classical mathematics, to such an extent that in his preface
[9, p. x], he writes that his ultimate goal is “to hasten the inevitable
day when constructive mathematics will be the accepted norm”. But he
was aware that for this transformation to occur he needed to persuade
his fellow mathematicians that the constructive program could succeed.
This seems to motivate his criticism of Brouwer’s “inflexible” attitude
towards classical mathematics.
Bishop was keen to reach out to the mathematical community, so
much so that soon after the publication of [9], he embarked on a series
of lectures on constructive mathematics across the USA. Although his
lectures attracted large audiences, he had limited success in persuading
classical mathematicians to join constructive mathematics.17 In fact,
Bishop thought that he had not been understood.
Notwithstanding his clear desire to communicate with classical math-
ematicians, some of Bishop’s statements on classical mathematics may
have well made the communication problem with the classical mathe-
matician worse.18 For example, Bishop [9, p. ix] claims that his book
is a “piece of constructivist propaganda” and goes on to write:
17See [12, p. 1] where Bishop states that his general impression was that in
those lectures he failed to communicate a real feeling for the philosophical issues
involved. Nerode [64] recalls that after his tour of the eastern universities in the
USA, Bishop told Nerode that he felt the trip might have been counterproductive,
as the audiences did not take his work seriously. Bishop also thought that the
difficulties experienced during the lecture tour contributed to the deterioration of
his health, resulting in a heart attack [64, p. 80]. See also Beeson’s foreword to
[13].
18For example, [9] is portrayed as “pure ideology” in [57] (p. 228) and the
introduction to that book is termed “embarrassing” (p. 239).
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Our program is simple: to give numerical meaning to as
much as possible of classical abstract analysis. Our mo-
tivation is the well-known scandal, exposed by Brouwer
(and others) in great detail, that classical mathematics
is deficient in numerical meaning.
More forceful are the remarks in [12], such as the claim that there is
a “philosophical deficit of major proportions” in contemporary mathe-
matics, and that the latter manifests the “debasement of meaning”.
A more conciliatory attitude characterises [11]. Here Bishop imag-
ines an ideal dialogue between Hilbert and Brouwer in which the two
mathematicians amicably discuss and compare their divergent foun-
dational views.19 Bishop [11, p. 510] claims that “[p]erhaps Brouwer
should not have denounced the mathematics that Hilbert wished to do
as meaningless.” In that text, Bishop strongly advocates a key role
for constructive mathematics as enhancing or deepening the classical
practice. The idea is that within constructive mathematics one can
express distinctions in meaning which are not available to the classical
mathematician, such as, for example, the distinction between state-
ments that have a computational interpretation from those that lack
one. Furthermore, constructive mathematics can be taken to be the
basis over which one expresses and analyses a classically valid theo-
rem T by means of implications of the form, e.g., LPO → T ∗, with
T ∗ a constructive substitute of the classical theorem T .20 Incidentally,
Bishop [11, p. 512] claims that implications such as LPO → T ∗ are
“ugly” and that we should try to obtain “an implication which is nat-
ural and reflects the nature of the problem”, i.e. one that is related to
the structure of a particular theorem in some special way. If we do that,
then working within a constructive context allows us to clearly single
out any non-constructive assumption and identify and bring to the fore
important aspects invisible from a classical perspective, especially the
computational content of mathematics.
We see here the emergence of an idea that has been profitably refined
in recent years giving rise to the Constructive reverse mathematics
programme. Constructive mathematics here is the core of a number
of varieties of mathematics, among which classical, Brouwerian and
19Note that in this very text, Bishop [11, p. 513-4] expresses, without argumen-
tation, a very harsh opinion of non-standard analysis: “It is difficult to believe that
debasement of meaning could be carried so far”.
20Bishop calls “Limited Principle of Omniscience” (LPO) the following state-
ment: if {an} is a binary sequence, then either there exists n such that an = 1, or
else an = 0 for each n.
9
Russian constructive mathematics.21 Indeed, each of the latter three
forms of mathematics may be developed on the basis of some suitable
extension of Bishop’s mathematics by characteristic principles. For
example, the principle of excluded middle and the axiom of choice can
be added to Bishop’s constructive mathematics, giving rise to a context
for developing classical mathematics, while adding to it the principle of
continuous choice to Bishop’s mathematics and the fan theorem allows
one to develop a Brouwerian form of mathematics.22 The constructive
mathematician claims that due to its privileged position, constructive
mathematics allows us to study from a “neutral” perspective relations
between mathematical notions belonging to these varieties, as well as
comparing these varieties with each other.
5. Formalization
As we saw in the quote from [9]’s preface at page 4 above, Bishop
also criticized Brouwer’s disciples. His concern in that respect was
especially Heyting’s formalisation of intuitionistic logic and subsequent
work in mathematical logic on intuitionistic formal systems. In this
respect, Bishop’s anti-formalist attitude appears particularly close to
Brouwer’s views. It is here that we find some of Bishop’s strongest
words of appreciation for Brouwer. Brouwer is often praised for his
realisation of the defects of classical mathematics, especially its lack of
numerical content, and his opposition to formalism. Bishop [9, p. 6]
credits to Brouwer the “disengagement of mathematics from logic”:
Brouwer fought the advance of formalism and under-
took the disengagement of mathematics from logic. He
wanted to strengthen mathematics by associating to ev-
ery theorem and every proof a pragmatically meaningful
interpretation.
As to the criticism of Brouwer’s disciples, Bishop (ibid.) writes that
Brouwer’s precepts were
formalized, giving rise to so–called intuitionistic number
theory, and [...] the formal system so obtained turned
out not to be of any constructive value. In fairness to
21See [21] for a comparison of these varieties of mathematics and see [53, 54, 76,
35, 55] for the constructive reverse mathematics programme.
22It should be noted that the constructive reverse mathematics programme is
often developed informally, without fixing specific formal systems. This makes
the above claims not completely precise and raises important questions. See the
discussion in [35, p. 100], and especially footnote 1.
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Brouwer it should be said that he did not associate him-
self with these efforts to formalize reality [...].
Bishop’s views on formalisation changed in some respects after the
completion of Foundations of Constructive Analysis, as witnessed, for
example, by [10]. Bishop did not give up criticizing formalism and
the dry study of formal systems as opposed to contentful mathemati-
cal practice (see especially [12]). However, by 1970 he seemed to have
reached the conclusion that formalization could be employed to the
benefit of mathematics. For example, in [10], he employs Gödel’s Di-
alectica interpretation to clarify the numerical content of mathematical
statements. One of Bishop’s main concerns in that text is the construc-
tive interpretation of conditional statements. Bishop [10, p. 53] begins
by giving a clear characterisation of constructive mathematics which
makes more explicit ideas already hinted at in [9].23 Constructive math-
ematics is here termed predictive since it
describes or predicts the result of certain finitely per-
formable, albeit hypothetical, computations within the
set of integers.
This interpretation of constructive in terms of finitely performable op-
erations with the integers is at the heart of Bishop’s approach to con-
structive mathematics and his insistence on the numerical content of
mathematical statements. After discussing some characteristic exam-
ples of mathematical problems, Bishop writes [10, p. 54]:
The most urgent task of the constructivist is to give
predictive embodiment to the ideas and techniques of
classical mathematics. Classical mathematics is not to-
tally divorced from reality. On the contrary, most of it
has a strongly constructive cast.
A key step in the task of giving predictive embodiment to classical
mathematics, is to endow conditional statements with suitable numer-
ical meaning and it is here that Bishop employs Gödel’s Dialectica
interpretation. Bishop expresses his dissatisfaction with the standard
BHK interpretation of implication as well as with a variant he proposed
in [9]. He therefore suggests to use Gödel’s Dialectica interpretation to
offer a more satisfactory computational interpretation of conditional
statements.24 While Bishop’s proposal in [10] deserves more careful
analysis, I cannot go into more detail in the present context. The main
23See e.g. [9, p. viii].
24Bridges [18] reports a conversation with Bishop that suggests that Bishop’s
dissatisfaction with material implication was a major motive for his “conversion”
to constructive mathematics.
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point I wish to highlight is that [10] witnesses an apparent change of
attitude, as formal systems are now taken to offer the means to tackle
these urgent tasks and Bishop envisages the possibility of a fruitful
cooperation between formalisation and mathematics. He writes [10, p.
60]:
Another important foundational problem is to find a for-
mal system that will efficiently express predictive math-
ematics. I think we should keep the formalism as prim-
itive as possible, starting with a minimal system and
enlarging it only if the enlargement serves a genuine
mathematical need. In this way the formalism and the
mathematics will hopefully interact to the advantage of
both.
It is possible that the difficulties Bishop encountered in conveying
his ideas to mainstream mathematicians and the fact that his mathe-
matics had a more favourable reception among logicians had an impact
on his apparent change in attitude.25 It seems also likely that in the
meantime Bishop had become more aware of the potential of applying
constructive mathematics to computer programming. This was pre-
figured already in Appendix B of [9].26 The remarkable point is that
while in his 1967 book, formalization was mainly seen as an artificial
obstacle, distracting us from mathematics’ genuine content, by 1970,
Bishop appears more interested in formalization, as long as it engages
with questions of meaning. Even after 1967, formalization for the sake
of formalization is strongly criticised. Now, however, Bishop thinks
that when properly employed, formal systems can be a useful tool for
clarifying issues of meaning and fostering possible applications to com-
puters.
6. Philosophy
We have seen Bishop’s concerns in [9] for Brouwer’s introduction
of free choice sequences and for his inflexible attitude. Furthermore,
Bishop in his 1967 book complained that Brouwer was preoccupied
25See [64].
26There has been a recent discussion among constructive mathematicians on
two unpublished manuscripts by Bishop, “A general language” and “How to com-
pile mathematics into Algol”. These texts also witness Bishop’s interest for for-
malization as a tool for the application of constructive mathematics to computer
programming. See e.g. https://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/∼mhe/Bishop/
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with philosophical aspects of constructivism at the expense of con-
crete mathematical activity and criticised his “metaphysical specula-
tion” over the nature of the continuum. This suggests a rather bleak
view of philosophy and its relation with mathematics. Philosophy, how-
ever, has a more prominent and positive role in subsequent texts by
Bishop. For example, in [11] Bishop clearly sees a role for philosophical
thought in mathematics.27 The article starts with this very powerful
statement:
There is a crisis in contemporary mathematics and any-
body who has not noticed it is being willfully blind. The
crisis is due to our neglect of philosophical issues.28
Bishop [11, p. 507] complains that university courses in the foundations
of mathematics focus on formal systems and their analysis “at the
expense of philosophical substance”. He writes that we need to change
emphasis from proving theorems to knowing what they mean, “from the
mechanics of the assembly line which keeps grinding out the theorems,
to an examination of what is being produced.” Philosophical reflection
ought to contribute to this shift of focus and clarify the meaning of
mathematical statements. Bishop writes that “[t]here is only one basic
criterion to justify the philosophy of mathematics, and that is, does it
contribute to making mathematics more meaningful.” [11, p. 508]
To explain why he takes issues of meaning as central to mathematics
and philosophy, Bishop [11, p. 507] asks the question “What do we
mean by an integer?” He considers three possible answers:
(1) an integer that we can actually compute, e.g. 3,
(2) one that we can compute in principle only, e.g. 99
9
,
(3) one that is not computable by known techniques, even in prin-
ciple, e.g. the integer that is defined to be 1 if φ is true and
0 otherwise, where φ is an open problem such as the Riemann
hypothesis.
A constructive approach to mathematics, so argues Bishop, is necessary
if we want to bring to light important distinctions such as that between
1 and 2 on the one side and 3 on the other. Bishop [11, p. 507] adds:
To my mind, it is a major defect of our profession that
we refuse to distinguish, in a systematic way, between
integers that are computable in principle and those that
27See also [10, 57], where Bishop claims that there must be a philosophical ex-
planation of the empirical fact that intuitionistic implication admits a numerical
interpretation.
28Italics in the original text.
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are not. We even refuse to do mathematics in such a
way so as to permit one to make the distinction.29
Philosophy therefore can help clarify the computational meaning of
mathematical statements and distinguish different statements depend-
ing on their meaning. In fact, Bishop’s philosophy of mathematics
rests on two crucial assumptions: the foundational role of the natu-
ral numbers within mathematics and the constructive interpretation
of the logical constants. As to the natural numbers, Bishop [9, p. 2]
asserts that “the primary concern of mathematics is number, and this
means the positive integers”. Bishop also mentions Kant, Kronecker
and echoes Brouwer, when he claims that
the development of the theory of the positive integers
from the primitive concept of the unit, the concept of
adjoining a unit, and the process of mathematical in-
duction carries complete conviction.
In later texts [10, 11, 12], it becomes even clearer that Bishop’s in-
sistence on the meaning (or lack of it) of mathematical statements is
very much related to the availability (or not) of an interpretation of
each statement in terms of some finitely performable operation with
the natural numbers.30 This fundamental role of the natural numbers
within mathematics reminds us not only of Kronecker, but also of pred-
icativism, especially as developed by Hermann Weyl [78, 79].31
With regard to the constructive interpretation of the logical con-
stants, the philosophical import of this choice becomes apparent es-
pecially when Bishop considers the interpretation of statements that
quantify over infinite domains. Bishop often stresses the fact that we
are finite beings, and claims that, for this reason, we should only be
concerned with forms of mathematics that a finite being can carry out,
at least in principle. Bishop’s qualification “in principle” is important,
as it clarifies that his aim is not to ban infinite domains, rather to give
prominence to the infinite domain of the natural numbers.
The thought that we should be concerned only with those forms of
mathematics that a finite being can, in principle, carry out, brings
Bishop to question the meaningfulness of classical quantification over
infinite domains, which he implicitly assimilates to the doings of an
29One may wonder whether we should also pay attention to the distinction be-
tween (1) and (2). Bishop [12, p. 9-10] briefly discusses this question, noting the
difficulties involved in demarcating (1) and (2). See also [45, 37, 81].
30See section 5.
31Bishop mentions Weyl, for example, in [9, p. 10].
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infinite mind. Once more, this is already hinted at in [9, p. 2], where
we read:
We are not interested in properties of the positive in-
tegers that have no descriptive meaning for finite man.
When a man proves a positive integer to exist, he should
show how to find it. If God has mathematics of his own
that needs to be done, let him do it himself.
These ideas are developed in more detail in [12], where Bishop explic-
itly frames the distinction between classical and constructive mathe-
matics in terms of the opposition between agents with finite and infinite
powers. For example, at page 12, he writes that while constructive
mathematics describes mathematical operations that can be carried
out by finite beings, “classical mathematics concerns itself with opera-
tions that can be carried out by God”. Subsequently he considers the
question of what powers should God (or a being with “non-finite pow-
ers”) have. A minimum requirement, according to Bishop, is a form
of limited omniscience, that enables such an agent to search through
a sequence of integers to determine whether they are all equal to 0 or
not. In other terms, a minimum requirement is the principle LPO.32
To summarise, for Bishop, a classical interpretation of the truth of
a universal statement whose quantifiers range over an infinite domain
involves an infinite search through the domain to check each individual
element. An aspect I find particularly fascinating is that this interpre-
tation of classical quantification bears surprising similarities with how
it is often framed by both predicativists and intuitionists. In this way
the debate over classical versus constructive mathematics is brought
back to the traditional theme of the opposition between finite and in-
finite domains, which was central to the thought of intuitionists and
predicativists alike. For example, a predicativist would consider quan-
tification (i.e. classical quantification) over an infinite domain justified
only if some constraints are met (e.g. if a step-by-step specification of
the domain is available). For an intuitionist, quantification over infinite
domains has to be intuitionistic rather than classical.33
I will be returning to the role of Bishop’s fundamental assumptions
regarding the natural numbers and logic at the end of this chapter.
Here I wish to get back to Bishop’s views on philosophy. After Bishop’s
32See footnote 20 for the statement LPO.
33See e.g. [78, p. 23] and [39, p. 41] for a similar interpretation of classical
quantification. See also [32] for a discussion of the key role of this interpretation
of quantification within the predicativist literature. See [31] for a discussion of the
relation between logic and infinite domains.
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unfavourable comments on philosophy in [9], it is surprising to read
Bishop’s claims that mathematics is experiencing a crisis which is due
to our neglect of philosophical issues and that philosophy can help
clarify fundamental distinctions in meaning [11]. There is clearly a
change in emphasis between the earlier and the later texts, and it is
natural to ask if this signals also a deep change in Bishop’s views on
philosophy. I am inclined to think that there is no direct disagreement
between [9] and subsequent texts. My impression is that Bishop may
have thought he was focusing on different points. On the one hand,
as already mentioned in section 3, Bishop’s most prominent criticism
of Brouwer’s philosophy is the charge of “metaphysical speculation”.
Though Bishop’s remarks are not only sharp but also very brief, and
therefore difficult to interpret, it is plausible that Bishop took cer-
tain philosophical questions, e.g. on whether there are mathematical
entities and whether they are mind-dependent or not, as largely irrele-
vant to the mathematical practice, or “superfluous”.34 His criticism of
Brouwer can therefore be explained by supposing that he thought that
Brouwer’s mathematics was deeply bound up with Brouwer’s views on
these matters, while Bishop’s own mathematics did not share these
characteristics. On the other hand, Bishop’s more positive comments
on philosophy in [11] relate to its possible role in clarifying the meaning
of mathematical statements, by distinguishing classical and construc-
tive interpretations of the logical constants and highlighting the key
foundational role of the natural numbers. It is possible that Bishop
thought that his views on this matter did not require him to take a
stance on the nature of mathematical entities, for example with regard
to their existence and their mind-dependence (or independence). Issues
of meaning, however, have for Bishop deep mathematical consequences,
as they determine whether a piece of mathematics has computational
content or not. To gain a computationally meaningful mathematics,
Bishop thinks, we need to abandon non-constructive methods of proofs
and reform mathematics constructively. These are the philosophical
questions that deserve to be pursued and it is in pursuing them that
philosophy can contribute to a fruitful development of mathematics.
7. Traditional philosophical arguments for intuitionistic
logic
We have seen Bishop’s thoughts on Brouwer, his criticism and, si-
multaneously, the appreciation for his predecessor’s achievements. The
philosophical literature presents us with a vast and important chapter
34See especially [12, p. 10-11].
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in the philosophy of mathematics on arguments for intuitionistic logic
and their critique. A central element of this debate is a number of
typical arguments or argument schemas which are usually taken to be
the most common defences of intuitionistic mathematics. Their key
elements are inspired especially by the thought of Brouwer, Heyting
and Dummett.35 Let us call them traditional philosophical arguments
for intuitionistic logic. A natural question to ask is whether Bishop’s
views are compatible with traditional philosophical arguments for intu-
itionistic logic. In fact, I am interested in a more general question, as I
would like to understand whether today’s constructive mathematicians
could employ traditional arguments for intuitionistic logic to support a
shift from classical to intuitionistic mathematics, or if entirely different
considerations are required. I take Bishop’s views, as described above,
as my starting point.
For our purposes, it is helpful to single out the most general charac-
teristics of traditional philosophical arguments for intuitionistic logic.
A typical feature of traditional arguments for intuitionistic logic is that
they move from philosophical considerations and reach the conclusion
that the general use of classical logic in mathematics is illegitimate.
As a consequence, these arguments reject classical mathematics and
propose its replacement with intuitionistic mathematics. The philo-
sophical considerations may concern, for example, the nature of the
mathematical entities, the nature of our mathematical activity, or im-
portant features of our mathematical language. Indeed, these tradi-
tional arguments are sometimes taken to entail not only that classical
logic is illegitimate, but also that it is meaningless, incoherent or even
unintelligible.36
For example, one traditional “Brouwerian” argument for intuitionis-
tic logic starts from a view of mathematics as an essentially language-
less activity of the mind and may also see mathematical entities as men-
tal constructions.37 This brings to the forefront the notion of proof of a
mathematical statement (or construction), as to ascertain the truth of a
mathematical statement, the mathematician needs to perform a certain
mental construction by producing a proof of it. A purported proof of
the principle of excluded middle is interpreted as a construction which
either proves or reduces to absurdity any mathematical statement, the
availability of which is highly implausible. Therefore the argument is
35See e.g. [26].
36See e.g. [46].
37See e.g. [23, p. 141], [50, p. 53] and Dummett’s discussion of traditional
intuitionism in [36, 38].
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seen to entail the rejection of the principle of excluded middle (and sim-
ilar essentially classical laws). More precisely, the Brouwerian mathe-
matician may accept the validity of the principle of excluded middle for
finitary statements within a thoroughly finitary context, but objects to
its assumption in infinitary contexts.38
Another kind of traditional argument for intuitionistic logic is Dum-
mettian in spirit and proceeds from semantic considerations to a rejec-
tion of classical logic in favour of intuitionistic logic. A key element
of this kind of argument is a view of language, and therefore mean-
ing, as communicable and observable, with the related thought that
use exhaustively determines meaning. This brings once more the focus
on proofs as instruments of verification of mathematical statements.
Classical logic is seen as embodying a verification-transcendent notion
of truth, and for this reason rejected, while intuitionistic logic is seen
as fully satisfying the requirement of meaning as communicable and
observable.
These arguments’ focus on proofs and constructions is clearly in
agreement with the perspective of both Bishop and today’s constructive
mathematicians. However, in light of Bishop’s criticism of Brouwer, it
is important to see whether these traditional arguments would overall
be acceptable to a constructive mathematician. In the next two sec-
tions, I consider three possible complaints that may be raised against
traditional arguments for intuitionistic logic and argue that the third
one highlights a conflict between these arguments and the very practice
of constructive mathematics.
8. Philosophical objections
A prominent reason for constructivism’s lack of popularity among
philosophers today is the fact that traditional arguments for intuition-
istic logic are typically bound up with forms of anti-realism which are
rather unpopular today. For example, the first kind of argument starts
38For example, Brouwer [23, p. 141] writes that “every construction of a bounded
finite character in a finite mathematical system can be attempted only in a finite
number of ways, and each attempt can either be carried through to completion, or
be continued until further progress is impossible. It follows that every assertion of
possibility of a construction of a bounded finite character in a finite mathematical
system can be judged. So, in this exceptional case, application of the principle of
the excluded third is permissible.” Here “judged” means “either proved or reduced
to absurdity”. Brouwer then goes on to use the example of “fleeing properties” to
argue that the principle of excluded middle is not permissible for “infinite systems”
such as the natural numbers.
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from a view of mathematics as free activity of the mind (and possi-
bly of mathematical entities as mental constructions), and therefore
is committed from the start to the mind-dependence of mathematical
proofs (and possibly also of mathematical entities). The second kind
of argument also gives rise to a form of anti-realism, as it focuses, once
more, on proofs as instruments of verification and rejects a verification-
transcendent notion of truth. Given that within today’s philosophy of
mathematics these forms of anti-realism are widely considered either
unattractive or untenable, traditional arguments for intuitionistic logic
do not enjoy widespread support among contemporary philosophers.
One may wonder whether the constructive mathematician would
deem these arguments unfit for the same reason. Looking again at
Bishop’s criticism of Brouwer’s philosophy, we see that it focuses es-
pecially on those parts of philosophy that Bishop seemed to consider
“superfluous” to the mathematical practice. Bishop, on the contrary,
pledged to develop his mathematics with an absolute minimum of philo-
sophical prejudice concerning the nature of constructive mathematics.
Therefore, it is plausible that Bishop would have found traditional ar-
guments for intuitionistic logic unpalatable in view of their alliance
with anti-realism. I think that the same is probably true of many con-
structive mathematicians today who work in the tradition initiated by
Bishop. It is, however, important to stress that Bishop and, plausibly,
a constructive mathematician more generally, would object to tradi-
tional arguments for very different reasons compared with contempo-
rary philosophers. While many contemporary philosophers find these
arguments’ anti-realism problematic, the constructive mathematician
would not want to commit to a specific view on the nature of mathemat-
ics (mathematical entities, mathematical discourse) and for that reason
would probably find the alliance with anti-realism unattractive.39
Philosophers of mathematics sometimes rise a different kind of ob-
jection against intuitionism: that it is a paradigmatic example of
philosophy-first. For example, in Chapter 2 of [71], Shapiro discusses
the relation between philosophy and mathematics and presents intu-
itionism, both in the Brouwerian and the Dummettian traditions, as
paradigmatic examples of philosophy-first: “the view that philosoph-
ical considerations should set the stage for and determine the proper
practice of mathematics”. [71, p. 21] Traditional arguments for in-
tuitionistic logic would seem to exemplify philosophy-first since they
39It is natural to ask whether the constructive mathematician’s hope to maintain
a neutral stance on crucial metaphysical issues can be sustained. While I cannot
discuss this issue in this note, in my conclusion I suggest further work that could
help clarify this point.
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move from philosophical considerations, e.g. specific thesis in the phi-
losophy of mind or in the philosophy of language, and conclude with
the rejection of classical mathematics. In the following, I review the
key ideas of philosophy-first and argue that, although prima facie ap-
pealing, a rejection of traditional arguments for intuitionistic logic on
the ground that they exemplify “philosophy-first” is problematic.
Shapiro claims that a philosophy-first approach to mathematics was
once common, as exemplified, for example, by Plato’s thought. Shapiro
and other contemporary philosophers find philosophy-first approaches
to mathematics problematic because purely philosophical considera-
tions are taken to determine and fix the way mathematics is done.
Many find this even more problematic when the philosophical conclu-
sions, as in the case of intuitionism, impose a revision of standard
mathematical practice. Shapiro [71, p. 30] writes: “Many contempo-
rary philosophers, including me, believe that scientists and mathemati-
cians usually know what they are doing, and that what they are doing
is worthwhile.” This has brought some philosophers to lean towards
the opposite to philosophy-first, the thesis that philosophy is irrelevant
to mathematics. Shapiro himself proposes a form of anti-revisionism,
but does not go all the way to support what he calls a “philosophy-
last-if-at-all” approach. Furthermore, he objects to the exclusive use of
philosophical considerations to restrict one’s practice in general, thus
even if, on their basis, one were to reject intuitionistic logic in favour
of the more standard classical logic.
We have seen that Bishop, especially in [11, 12], did see a role for
philosophical considerations in mathematics. He thought that disagree-
ment over meaning has to be settled prior to disagreement over specific
assumptions and techniques. He may therefore have found no fault
with philosophy-first, as long as the philosophical considerations were
prompted by issues of meaning, rather than based on what he consid-
ered “speculation” regarding the nature of mathematics. What about
today’s constructive mathematicians? Would they find this objection
to traditional arguments for intuitionistic logic compelling?
It is natural to expect that constructive mathematicians would be
sympathetic with the thought that it should be the mathematician
rather than the philosopher to decide which principles and techniques
to employ in mathematics.40 However, notwithstanding the appeal
40This does not mean that they would also support a form of anti-revisionism
which sanctions classical mathematics, as they would rather claim that there are
good mathematical reasons to revise the standard classical practice.
20
of this thought, I think that talk of “philosophy-first” may oversim-
plify the complex interaction between philosophy and mathematics.
One may note, for example, that the debate on philosophy-first of-
ten artificially opposes mathematicians and philosophers, while histor-
ically many major mathematicians were also major philosophers (or
philosophers of mathematics).41 There is, of course, an obvious re-
ply to this worry. One may observe that even if the same person,
say Brouwer, engaged simultaneously in mathematical and philosoph-
ical inquiry, we may carefully distinguish between philosophical and
mathematical components of his thought. For example, one may claim
that Brouwer pursued philosophical rather than mathematical thoughts
when he introduced his notion of free choice sequences. We have seen
that Bishop probably thought of Brouwer along similar lines.
I find this attempt to rescue the “philosophy-first” objection to tra-
ditional arguments unconvincing, since more needs to be said on how
to draw the line between mathematical and philosophical thinking. I
tend to think that if we look more carefully at mathematicians’ reasons
for choosing a certain methodology or introducing some new concepts,
it is likely that a number of different factors will have a role, some
mathematical, some philosophical and some, furthermore, sociological
in character. Typical discussions on mathematical methodology are a
mixed bag, a blend of different issues that are difficult to categorise
as exclusively mathematical or exclusively philosophical. This suggests
that either the very notion of philosophy-first is hopelessly imprecise, or
that one should offer a very careful formulation of it and, consequently,
of this objection. One possible strategy would be to try and formulate
the latter in terms of reasons that are predominantly philosophical or
mathematical in character, rather than exclusively so. It is unclear to
me if this could be done in a satisfactory way, but perhaps, if it can be
done, it would suffice to express the worry that traditional arguments
for intuitionistic logic are examples of philosophy-first.
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that we can meaningfully
talk of philosophy-first and that traditional arguments for intuitionistic
logic do constitute examples of it. Does this imply that the construc-
tive mathematician should reject those arguments on this ground? I
think the constructive mathematician should clearly say “no”. What-
ever the reasons for intuitionistic mathematics, the key question the
mathematician will ask is whether the resulting mathematics is inter-
esting and fruitful. Banning philosophy-first arguments a priori could
41This point is acknowledged in [71, p. 31]. I would like to thank a referee for
suggesting to further develop this point.
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then result in obstructing the development of fruitful and interesting
mathematics, making mathematical progress more difficult. Brouwer’s
intuitionism is an emblematic example. One may claim that Brouwer’s
reasons for intuitionistic mathematics were predominantly philosophi-
cal in character, and find this unsatisfactory in some respect. However,
it is clear that, this notwithstanding, the arguments Brouwer adduced
for intuitionism had important and useful mathematical consequences,
as they gave rise to the discovery of intuitionistic logic and opened
up a whole new realm of mathematics. For these reasons, I think
the constructive mathematician should not object to traditional argu-
ments for intuitionistic logic on the sole basis that they are examples
of philosophy-first.
On reflection, it seems that the philosophical discussion on
philosophy-first highlights a different point. We have seen that those
who object to traditional arguments for intuitionistic logic because they
consider them paradigmatic examples of “philosophy-first” often ex-
press concerns for the revisionary spirit of these arguments. This sug-
gests that they are concerned not only with the motives supporting
the premises of these arguments, but also with these arguments’ con-
sequences, i.e. the fact that they demand a thorough change of the
mathematical practice. In the next section, I focus, although from a
different perspective, on crucial consequences of traditional arguments
for intuitionistic logic and argue that they suggest the need for new
arguments for constructive mathematics.
9. Too strong
I believe that a better reason for objecting to traditional arguments
for intuitionistic logic is that they are too strong. These arguments,
as we have seen, entail the outright rejection of classical logic and,
consequently, of classical mathematics. They are often taken to imply
that classical mathematics is incoherent, and are sometimes also read
as entailing the thorough unintelligibility of classical mathematics. For
example, in his famous article The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic
Logic [36, p. 215], Dummett asks “what plausible rationale can there
be for repudiating, within mathematical reasoning, the canons of clas-
sical logic in favour of intuitionistic logic?” Dummett clarifies that he
is not concerned with “justifications of intuitionistic mathematics from
an eclectic point of view, that is, one which admits intuitionistic math-
ematics as a legitimate and interesting form of mathematics alongside
classical mathematics.” Dummett’s concern is rather the standpoint of
the intuitionists themselves, who took classical mathematics to employ
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forms of reasoning which are invalid on any legitimate way of construing
mathematical statements. Similarly to the view that Dummett exam-
ines in his article, also the traditional arguments for intuitionistic logic
we considered above are usually taken to completely reject classical
mathematics as illegitimate.
According to Bishop, classical mathematics is deficient in meaning
so much so that he hopes that constructive mathematics will even-
tually replace it. Bishop does not, however, maintain that classical
mathematics is outright illegitimate. The constructive mathematician
may stress, like Bishop, that there are good, indeed, better reasons to
work constructively, compared with working classically, and that clas-
sical mathematics as a whole cannot be given constructive meaning, as
not every classical theorem can be given a computational interpreta-
tion. However, there are parts of classical mathematics that do have
computational content, and we can make some sense of the rest, for
example, in terms of conditional statements that prefix a suitable clas-
sical statement to a constructively meaningful one.42 Furthermore, at
least initially, classical mathematics is seen as a guide that helps the
constructive mathematician develop new mathematics. For example,
Bishop writes [9, p. x]:
We are not contending that idealistic mathematics is
worthless from the constructive point of view. This
would be as silly as contending that unrigorous math-
ematics is worthless from the classical point of view.
Every theorem proved with idealistic methods presents
a challenge: to find a constructive version, and to give
it a constructive proof.
For these reasons, I believe, Bishop should consider traditional ar-
guments for intuitionistic logic not viable, as they imply the outright
rejection of classical mathematics, if not its unintelligibility. I would
think that many constructive mathematicians (Bishop-style) would also
see things in essentially this way. One reason is that there is a tension
between these arguments’ conclusions and the contemporary construc-
tive practice. First of all, claims of utter unintelligibility of classical
mathematics are implausible given the above-mentioned use by the con-
structive mathematician of classical proofs as an initial guide. Second,
constructive mathematicians believe that much of classical mathemat-
ics does not possess the same clear constructive meaning as a piece of
constructive mathematics, and find classical mathematics unappealing
for that reason. But they would certainly claim that they understand
42See page 9.
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a classical theorem as clearly as any classical mathematician. In fact,
as mentioned at page 9 above, they would argue that they can offer
a more precise analysis of a classical theorem, separating its construc-
tive core from (possibly) an essentially classical component, such as,
for example, LPO. More importantly, the constructive reverse math-
ematics programme, which was mentioned in section 4, also requires
a more tolerant approach to classical mathematics. One of its stated
aims is to clarify the relation between concepts and theorems belonging
to a number of mathematical practices, among which the classical one.
A crucial claim of the constructive reverse mathematics programme is
that constructive mathematics offers a “neutral” perspective, on the
basis of which to analyse classical mathematics.43 Classical mathe-
matics therefore is not to be rejected and, I would suggest, also not
completely devoid of interest from the perspective of the constructive
mathematician. Constructive mathematics is taken to be highly prefer-
able, among other reasons for its computational content and because
it offers an ideal ground from which to carry out a fine comparison be-
tween mathematical notions, theorems and proofs in different contexts.
However, the constructive mathematician cannot on these sole grounds
outlaw classical mathematics.
10. Concluding remarks
If I am right to think that the constructive mathematician cannot
accept traditional arguments for intuitionistic logic because their con-
sequences are too strong, this raises a pressing question for the philoso-
pher of mathematics: are there other arguments for constructive math-
ematics that can play a similar role as traditional arguments for intu-
itionistic mathematics? As a first step towards answering this question,
we may consider what are the reasons for doing mathematics construc-
tively. We have seen that Bishop’s aim was to develop a “meaningful”
form of mathematics, one that “predicts the results of certain finitely
performable, albeit hypothetical, computations with the set of inte-
gers” [10, p. 53]. For Bishop, this meant that working constructively
also deepens mathematics by making available important distinctions
that a classical mathematician does not perceive. Furthermore, the
constructive approach makes it possible to develop a computational
form of mathematics which has systematic application to real life com-
puters. In fact, for today’s constructive mathematician, the principal
reason for working constructively is the direct computational content of
constructive mathematics. The other reasons Bishop mentions are also
43This is a strong claim. See, for example, [74] for criticism.
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important. Thirty-odd years ago, Fred Richman [66, 67] further devel-
oped some of Bishop’s remarks, arguing that constructive mathematics
has the advantage of being more general than classical mathematics.
Since constructive mathematics avoids the use of the excluded middle
(and cognate principles such as LPO) but does not introduce princi-
ples that diverge from classical mathematics (contrary to Brouwerian
mathematics), all of its theorems are also classically true. Therefore,
constructive mathematics is more general than classical mathematics.
Richman’s notion of generality may be clarified by his comparison with
algebra [66, p. 126]:
Because intuitionistic mathematics is the weaker theory,
its theorems have more models, so they are more general:
for example, a theorem that holds for all groups is more
general than one holding only for abelian groups.
Similarly to Bishop, Richman also stresses the importance of the possi-
bility of distinguishing between mathematical concepts which are rou-
tinely identified in classical contexts.44 I would like to call this feature
of constructive mathematics “refinement”, as it allows for finer distinc-
tions compared with classical mathematics. To summarise, the analy-
sis of Bishop and Richman suggest that there are at least three main
reasons for working constructively: (i) the possibility of giving direct
computational meaning to mathematical statements, in particular one
that can be readily applied to computers, (ii) the greater generality
(in the sense above) of the resulting theorems and (iii) refinement, i.e.
the availability of significant distinctions that are unavailable within a
classical context.
Can these reasons support a new argument for constructive mathe-
matics? Billinge [7] seems to think so, but argues that it would be a
mathematical rather than a philosophical argument. Billinge considers
generality and refinement, and thinks of them primarily as mathemat-
ical rather than philosophical motives for constructive mathematics.45
She also distinguishes between a liberal and a radical constructivist.46
The first “believes that constructive mathematics is preferable to clas-
sical mathematics, but that classical mathematics is at least coherent.”
44See the example at page 6.
45Surprisingly, in her concluding discussion in [7], Billinge does not mention
the computational content as a key reason for doing mathematics constructively,
although she discusses it in relation to the special status of the natural numbers
within Bishop’s philosophy.
46See also [47, p. 222].
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The second “takes it that classical mathematics is absolutely illegiti-
mate and cannot be rendered coherent under any interpretation.” [7,
p. 177] She argues that Bishop did his mathematics in a construc-
tive manner for explicit philosophical reasons and that he was a liberal
rather than a radical constructivist. But she also argues that Bishop’s
philosophical comments cannot be fleshed out into an adequate phi-
losophy of constructive mathematics. Billinge [7, p. 188] claims that
the basic premises of Bishop’s position are controversial, in particular
so are Bishop’s main assumptions – that all mathematical statements
should have numerical content and that existence claims should be in-
terpreted constructively. Her main complaint is that Bishop does not
give good enough grounds for accepting these controversial assump-
tions, and that, as a consequence, Bishop’s philosophical remarks can-
not be taken to fully support liberal constructivism.
Billinge [7, p. 192] thinks that generality and refinement, as spelled
out by Richman, are key mathematical advantages of working construc-
tively and provide “the most promising argument for liberal construc-
tivism at the moment”. However, such an argument would not be a
philosophical argument. In fact, Billinge [7, p. 190-91] claims that
she cannot see “how one could give purely philosophical arguments
for the superiority of constructive mathematics without overplaying
one’s hand and concluding that constructive mathematics is the only
acceptable way of doing mathematics.” Succinctly: “any adequate
philosophical defence of constructive mathematics will justify radical
constructivism.” [7, p. 192]
I agree with Billinge that overall Bishop’s texts suggest a liberal
rather than a radical constructivist position and also that Bishop does
not offer a full philosophical defence of his claims. I think that this
should not be surprising, as Bishop was a mathematician whose main
focus was the concrete mathematical activity and whose philosophical
views are briefly presented in remarks which appear primarily in intro-
ductions to technical work or in lecture notes. Furthermore, I also agree
with Billinge that generality and refinement are important motives for
constructive mathematics and that they are primarily motivated by
mathematical needs, rather than explicit philosophical considerations.
I am not persuaded, however, that it is utterly implausible that these
reasons could play a key role in a philosophical argument for liberal
constructivism. I cannot argue for this here due to space constraints. I
will rather focus on a different point that is more relevant in the present
context.
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As already mentioned, for many contemporary constructive mathe-
maticians the direct computational content of constructive mathemat-
ics is the primary motive for developing this form of mathematics. In
view of Billinge’s discussion, one may wonder whether this should count
as primarily philosophical, mathematical or, perhaps, neither e.g., as
an external practically motivated reason for doing mathematics con-
structively? I can think of at least two different ways of looking at
the computational content of mathematical statements. First, there is
the fact that if a mathematical statement can be given computational
meaning then this can be employed in computer applications. In this
sense, arguing for constructive mathematics on the basis of the avail-
ability of direct computational meaning seems to rely on pragmatic
considerations, external to the mathematical practice. Second, the fo-
cus on the computational content may instead be determined by a
preference for algorithmic proofs, independently from the possibility of
applications.47 Some mathematicians have a preference for proofs that
are more algorithmic and explicit, proofs that construct their witnesses
step-by-step. We have seen Bishop’s focus on the natural numbers and
on finite operations over the natural numbers. For Bishop the natural
numbers have a key foundational role in mathematics, that he assimi-
lates to the role they played for Kronecker. It is in this sense that the
computational content can be taken as independent of practical con-
siderations and not merely a mathematical but also as a philosophical
reason for doing mathematics constructively.
Billinge takes the computational content (in this second sense) to be
one of Bishop’s main controversial assumptions, and argues that not
only does Bishop inadequately support this assumption but, in fact,
that it cannot be given adequate support in a way that coheres with
Bishop’s overall views. My impression is that Billinge reaches this con-
clusion because she takes Bishop to suggest an ontological reduction
of mathematical entities to the natural numbers, i.e. the thought that
every mathematical entity can ultimately be reduced to some combi-
nation of natural numbers. She also suggests that for Bishop we have
direct epistemic access to the natural numbers in a way that is analo-
gous to our access to the physical world via sense perception. She then
argues that this can only be supported if we take mathematical entities
to be mental constructions, which would contradict Bishop’s desire to
remain neutral on metaphysical issues.
47See also [17, 20] for a discussion of the algorithmic nature of constructive
mathematics. See [29] for a similar distinction.
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I do not think Bishop proposes such a reductive strategy, exactly
because he argues against taking a specific stance on the nature of
mathematical entities. This is also evidenced by the fact that Bishop
frequently stresses the role in constructive mathematics of finitely per-
formable operations with the natural numbers. This is suggestive that
Bishop’s focus is not the natural number themselves, but the possibil-
ity of dynamically developing mathematics via finite operations with
the natural numbers, whatever the natural numbers may be. I take
this to support the view that Bishop is not arguing, as Billinge [7, p.
188] claims, that every mathematical entity should be reduced to the
natural numbers, i.e. that the rational numbers, the real or the com-
plex numbers are really just sets of natural numbers. I rather think
that Bishop’s remarks are better read in epistemological terms, leaving
unanswered the question of the real nature of mathematical entities
(including the natural numbers).
In fact, even if Bishop’s own remarks are not to be read as I sug-
gest, I believe that if we were to expand and build on his philosophical
remarks more generally, the best strategy would be to focus on the epis-
temological claim that the natural numbers have a fundamental role
in our understanding of mathematics in general. I take Bridges [19] to
give a somewhat similar interpretation of contemporary constructivism,
though without the commitment to the primality of the natural num-
bers that characterises Bishop’s approach. Bridges [19] distinguishes
between an ontological and an epistemological form of constructivism.
He associates the first one with Brouwer and sees it as motivated by
the belief that mathematical objects are mental creations. The sec-
ond one focuses on methodological issues and takes them to motivate
the shift to intuitionistic logic. Bridges takes today’s constructivists
of the Bishop school to be epistemological constructivists, rather than
ontological constructivists.
I am tempted to think that there is the possibility of giving philo-
sophical substance to a Bishop-inspired form of epistemological con-
structivism, i.e. one which focuses on the methodology of mathematics
and reaches constructivism on the basis of a blend of mathematical
and philosophical considerations. If understood in this way, Bishop’s
discussion of the distinction between finite and infinite domains gains a
new prominence. A natural way to expand Bishop’s remarks would be
to look at the predicativist tradition, and especially Weyl’s thought.48
I am inclined to think that in this way Bishop’s philosophical remarks
may be enriched to give a new argument for constructive mathematics
48See [28, 30] for discussion and references.
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that takes the natural numbers as fundamental without rejecting tout
court classical mathematics.49
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Jäger, G., and Sieg, W. (eds), Feferman on Foundations: Logic,
Mathematics, Philosophy. Springer International Publishing.
[31] Crosilla, L. 2019. The entanglement of logic and set theory, con-
structively. Inquiry, 0(0), 1–22.
[32] Crosilla, L. 2020. From predicativity to intuitionistic logic, via
Dummett. Unpublished Manuscript.
[33] Crosilla, L. forthcoming. Predicativity and constructive mathe-
matics. In: S. Boscolo, G. Olivieri, and Ternullo, C. (eds), Objects,
Structures, and Logics. Springer International Publishing.
[34] Crosilla, L., and Schuster, P. (eds). 2005. From Sets and Types
to Topology and Analysis: Towards Practicable Foundations for
Constructive Mathematics. Oxford Logic Guides, vol. 48. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
[35] Diener, H. 2020. Constructive Reverse Mathematics.
[36] Dummett, M. 1975. The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic.
Pages 5–40 of: Rose, H.E., and Shepherdson, J.C. (eds), Logic
Colloquium ’73, vol. 80. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of
Mathematics.
[37] Dummett, M. 1975. Wang’s Paradox. Synthese, 30(3-4), 201–32.
[38] Dummett, M. 1977. Elements of Intuitionism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
[39] Dummett, M. 2000. Elements of Intuitionism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. Second edition.
31
[40] Feferman, S. 1975. A language and axioms for explicit mathemat-
ics. Pages 87–139 of: Crossley, J. (ed), Algebra and Logic. Lecture
Notes in Mathematics, vol. 450. Springer, Berlin.
[41] Feferman, S. 1979. Constructive theories of functions and classes.
In: Logic Colloquium ’78. North Holland, Amsterdam.
[42] Ferreiros, J. 2016. Mathematical Knowledge and the Interplay of
Practices. Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press.
[43] Friedman, H. 1973. The consistency of classical set theory relative
to a set theory with intuitionistic logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic,
38, 315–319.
[44] Friedman, H. 1977. Set-theoretical foundations for constructive
analysis. Annals of Mathematics, 105, 1–28.
[45] Goodman, N.D. 1981. Reflections on Bishop’s philosophy of math-
ematics. Pages 135–145 of: Richman, F. (ed), Constructive Math-
ematics. Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 873. Springer, Berlin,
Heidelberg.
[46] Hellman, G. 1989. Never Say “Never”!: On the Communication
Problem Between Intuitionism and Classicism. Philosophical Top-
ics, 17(2), 47–67.
[47] Hellman, G. 1993a. Constructive mathematics and quantum me-
chanics: Unbounded operators and the spectral theorem. Journal
of Philosophical Logic, 22, 221–248.
[48] Hellman, G. 1993b. Gleason’s Theorem Is Not Constructively
Provable. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 22(2), 193–203.
[49] Hellman, G. 1998. Mathematical Constructivism in Spacetime.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 49(3), 425–450.
[50] Heyting, A. 1931. Die Intuitionistische Grundlegung der Mathe-
matik. Erkenntnis, 2(1), 106–115. Reprinted in [4], pages 52-61,
with the title The Intuitionist Foundations of Mathematics. (Page
references are to the reprinting).
[51] Heyting, A. 1956. Intuitionism an Introduction. North-Holland.
[52] Hilbert, D. 1927. Die Grundlagen der Mathematik. Abhandlun-
gen aus dem Seminar der Hamburgischen Universität, 6, 65–85.
Reprinted and translated as The foundations of mathematics, in
van Heijenoort, 1967, pp. 464–479.
[53] Ishihara, H. 2005. Constructive reverse mathematics: compact-
ness properties. In: Crosilla, L., and Schuster, P. (eds), From Sets
and Types to Topology and Analysis: Towards practicable founda-
tions for constructive mathematics. Oxford Logic Guides, vol. 48.
Oxford University Press.
[54] Ishihara, H. 2006. Reverse mathematics in Bishop’s constructive
mathematics. Philosophia Scientiae, 6, 43–59.
32
[55] Ishihara, H. 2022. An introduction to constructive reverse math-
ematics. This volume.
[56] Kreisel, G. 1970. Church’s Thesis: A Kind of Reducibility Axiom
for Constructive Mathematics. Studies in logic and the foundations
of mathematics, 60, 121–150.
[57] Kreisel, G., and MacIntyre, A. 1982. Constructive Logic Versus
Algebraization I. Pages 217–260 of: Troelstra, A.S., and van Dalen,
D. (eds), The L. E. J. Brouwer Centenary Symposium. Studies in
Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, vol. 110. Elsevier.
[58] Mancosu, P. 2008. The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford.
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